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Abstract—HTTPS is one of the most important protocols used
to secure communication and is, fortunately, becoming more
pervasive. However, especially the long tail of websites is still not
sufficiently secured. HTTPS involves different types of users, e.g.,
end users who are forced to make security decisions when faced
with warnings or administrators who are required to deal with
cryptographic fundamentals and complex decisions concerning
compatibility.
In this work, we present the first qualitative study of both
end user and administrator mental models of HTTPS. We inter-
viewed 18 end users and 12 administrators; our findings reveal
misconceptions about security benefits and threat models from
both groups. We identify protocol components that interfere with
secure configurations and usage behavior and reveal differences
between administrator and end user mental models.
Our results suggest that end user mental models are more
conceptual while administrator models are more protocol-based.
We also found that end users often confuse encryption with
authentication, significantly underestimate the security benefits
of HTTPS. They also ignore and distrust security indicators
while administrators often do not understand the interplay of
functional protocol components. Based on the different mental
models, we discuss implications and provide actionable recom-
mendations for future designs of user interfaces and protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of information technologies, protecting com-
munication content at large scale has become more important
than ever before. Almost twenty years after Whitten and
Tygar’s usability evaluation of PGP [1], reliable encryption
still cannot be taken for granted even though adoption rates
are growing [2]. In today’s Internet ecosystem, HTTPS is
the fundamental cryptographic protocol to secure information
in transit and to ensure data integrity and privacy between
two communicating parties. However, HTTPS is still not the
default for all websites, especially when it comes to the long
tail of websites [2], [3]. At the time of writing, Internet-wide
scans from SSLPulse suggest that 36,3% of sites surveyed still
have inadequate security1. Recent studies, e.g., by Krombholz
et al. [4], show that this is, among other reasons, due to
the fact that the deployment of cryptographic protocols is a
difficult task even for knowledgeable users. Similar to message
1https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/, Accessed: 10/30/2018
encryption, HTTPS confronts different types of (mostly techni-
cally adept) users with cryptographic algorithms and protocols
which they do not fully understand – see, e.g., Krombholz
et al. [4], Green and Smith [5], Acer et al.[3], Fahl et al.
[6], Oltrogge et al. [7], and Reeder et al. [8]. In addition,
users who are exposed to poorly configured sites are forced
to make security-critical decisions and are often not aware of
the respective consequences.
We argue that we still do not understand why these carefully
designed protocols do not meet the needs of (knowledgeable)
users to securely operate cryptographic applications. There-
fore, this work employs an inductive approach to learn about
the root causes for user misconceptions by formalizing mental
models of end users and administrators. In particular, we focus
on how users think that HTTPS works and against which types
of attackers they think they are protected. By doing so, we
get a detailed understanding of which knowledge gaps have
to be filled in future protocol designs. We thereby contribute
a qualitative study with 18 end users and 12 experienced
administrators; our findings reveal interesting differences in
the mental models of these two distinct user groups.
We found that many non-expert participants significantly
underestimate the level of protection that HTTPS offers,
whereas administrators generally have a good understanding of
what HTTPS can or cannot protect against. We also discovered
that most administrators have little conceptual knowledge of
how the protocol works but are very familiar with the different
steps of establishing a communication. Key elements are
often considered as blackboxes and poorly understood. We
further found that the distinction between authentication and
encryption is unclear to many users–even to some experts.
Based on our findings, we identified protocol components that
diverge from user mental models and discuss implications and
potential countermeasures.
The goal of this paper is to derive and compare mental
models in order to understand if and how they deviate from
the underlying functionality of HTTPS and their impact on
security. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
We conducted an in-depth qualitative study with n = 30
participants to formalize user mental models and threat
models and to understand users’ perceptions, attitudes
and misconceptions of how HTTPS works. By focusing on
different scenarios and studying two distinct groups of users,
namely end users and system administrators, we were able
to reveal group-specific differences.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we examine related works on
HTTPS/SSL/TLS from both the expert and non-expert
user’s perspective, message encryption, and mental model
studies.
A. HTTPS From the Expert Users’ Perspective
Krombholz et al. [4] identified major challenges in HTTPS
deployment from an administrator’s perspective and showed
that the procedure is too complex. They identified usability
issues and protocol components that are difficult to understand
even for knowledgeable users who managed to deploy valid
configurations. The results from Krombholz et al. [4] also
suggest that administrators rely heavily on online sources
and that the quality of these resources often leads to faulty
implementation. Acar et al. [9] showed that this is also the case
for API documentations, which influence code performance
and security. Their findings suggest simplifying interfaces,
providing more support for a broad range of tasks, and giving
code examples to promote effective security in applications.
These API documentations are among the primary sources that
construct mental models.
Fahl et al. [10] studied reasons for webmasters to miscon-
figure security-critical X.509 certificates which do not validate
on their website. They found that one third accidentally mis-
configured those certificates and two thirds explained why they
deliberately used non-validating certificates. Oltrogge et al. [7]
studied the applicability of pinning for non-browser software
and implemented a web-application to support the deployment
of pining-protected TLS implementations. Manousis et al.
[11] found that only 50% of the domains with Let’s Encrypt
certificates actually responded with a valid LE certificate on
the standard HTTPS port which indicates that even automation
does not obviate the need for administrators to deal with the
complexity of the protocol, resulting in serious misconfigura-
tions.
While these works [4], [10], [7] identified specific (protocol-
related) tasks that are not sufficiently understood by knowl-
edgeable users such as administrators and developers, they did
not show how they are actually understood. Based on their
findings, we measure user mental models to detect reasons for
inadequately secured configurations and security misbehavior.
B. HTTPS From the End Users’ Perspective
To ensure a safe usage of the HTTPS infrastructure, SSL
warnings and connection security indicators serve as primary
interaction components for end users. Related work in our
field has significantly contributed to improving these UI com-
ponents; Sunshine et al. [12] conducted the first study on the
effectiveness on browser warnings. Harbach et al. [13] studied
how linguistic properties influence the perceived difficulty
of warning messages. Akhawe et al. [14] focused on the
(in)effectiveness of different security warnings in browsers,
which are strongly correlated to user experiences. Weber et
al. [15] used participatory design to improve security warnings.
Felt et al. [16] studied differences of SSL warnings between
Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox along with click-through
rates. As a follow-up, Felt et al. [17] introduced new SSL
warnings, which helped 30% of the tested users to stay safe.
Those opinionated design-based warnings were released by
Google Chrome. To provide users with further visual feedback,
they proposed a new set of browser security indicators for
HTTPS security in Google Chrome [18] based on a user study
with 1,329 participants.
Even though adherence rates have improved, they could still
be much higher. Reeder et al. [8] explored reasons for low
adherence rates and misconceptions about browser warnings.
They identified contextual misunderstandings that influence
users in clicking through warnings and found that users are
inconsistent in their perceptions and security assessments.
Acer et al. [3] studied over 2,000 Google Chrome browsing
errors and classified their root causes. They showed that
the majority of errors were caused on the client-side or by
network issues and proposed mitigation for spurious certificate
warnings. Chothia et al. [19] presented a security analysis of
TLS used in UK banking apps that emphasized the importance
of security by revealing privacy and security flaws.
Our work extends the state of the art by studying how
connection indicators, warnings, and other UI cues contribute
to the formation of valid mental models and perceptions of
how to operate the system in the most secure manner. While
related work has significantly improved security indicators
and warnings and thus improved adherence rates, our results
suggest that these UX components do not necessarily establish
trust among end users.
C. Message Encryption
Already in 1999 Whitten and Tygar [1] had found that
user interfaces for security applications need different usability
standards to be effective. This led to a series of other studies,
especially as messaging encryption became popular.
Fahl et al. [20] conducted a screening study on the us-
ability of the message security of Facebook. Based on their
findings that automatic key management and key recovery
capabilities are important, they implemented a usable, service-
based encryption mechanism. The effect of integration and
transparency on users’ trust was examined by Atwater et
al. [21] and indicated that users have a stronger confidence
in desktop applications and integrated encryption software
than others. Different Instant Messaging applications were
evaluated concerning their usability by Herzberg et al. [22],
Schroder et al. [23], and Vaziripour et al. [24], concluding that
the security mechanisms are impractical due to incorrect men-
tal models, a lack of understanding, and usability problems.
Secure email exchange is desired by many users. However,
as found by Ruoti et al. [25], the time component detains
regular usage since simultaneous users are unsure at which
point in time they use encrypted emails. Lerner et al. [26]
introduced a prototype for encrypting emails with Keybase
for automatic key management and showed that lawyers and
journalists were able to efficiently send encrypted e-mails with
few errors. However, the operational constraints differ, and
there is no one-size-fits-all solution.
Abu-Salma et al. [27] studied users’ perceptions of secure
communication tools and reasons for not adopting them,
and revealed misconceptions of encryption concepts in users’
mental models.
D. Mental Models
Users’ mental models influence their behaviour and reac-
tions in certain situations. Wash et al. [28] proposed a way to
shape the mental models of non-experts to encourage security
behavior irrespective of the users’ technical understanding.
Bravo-Lillo et al. [29] studied how users perceive and respond
to security alerts. Renaud et al. [30] found that incomplete
threat models, misaligned incentives, and a general absence of
understanding of the email architecture lead to non-adoption
of end-to-end encryption for emails. Oates et al. [31] explored
mental models of privacy, and Wu et al. [32] explored end
user mental models of encryption. Abu Salma et al. [33]
quantified mental models and misconceptions of a hypothetical
encrypted communication tool and found a large percentage
of users underestimate the security benefits of E2E encrypted
tools. Kang et al. [34] measured mental models about the
Internet and its privacy and security challenges. Based on their
findings, they proposed systems and policies which do not rely
on the knowledge of users. Gallagher et al. [35] conducted a
study with experts and non-experts on their mental models of
the Tor network and found severe gaps in their knowledge
which could lead to deanonymization. Zeng et al. [36] studied
user understanding of smart-home technologies and revealed
mismatches in users threat models compared to reality. Related
works on mental models revealed severe misconceptions with
respect to message encryption or specific tools. We replicate
and confirm some conceptual misunderstandings on message
encryption and extend the state of the art by investigating
mental models of transport layer security from the end users’
and administrators’ perspective. In comparison to message
encryption, especially, the configuration of the protocol from
an administrators’ perspective is complex and has a severe
impact on the security of the Internet ecosystem.
III. METHODOLOGY
In the following, we describe our research questions and
how we address them, i.e., the study design and procedure of
our semi-structured interviews, recruitment, participants, and
how we finally analyzed the resulting data. Our goal is to
understand why end users and administrators make mistakes
when using or configuring HTTPS that result in security-
critical situations. Our approach is to construct theories by
means of identification of patterns in the data [37] (inductive
approach), which is why we opted for a qualitative interview
study with a diverse sample of participants. In particular, we
sought to answer the following research questions:
• What are people’s expectations and perceptions of en-
cryption and visiting sites via HTTPS?
• How well do users understand the associated threat mod-
els?
• What are the differences between end users’ and admin-
istrators’ mental models of HTTPS?
A. Study Design and Procedure
Kearney et al. [38] showed that humans commonly possess
tacit knowledge about technology, i.e., superficial knowledge,
of which they are not aware and which they cannot easily
articulate. Nevertheless, this tacit knowledge determines peo-
ple’s decisions and responses to new situations. Our study is
designed in a way that it supports participants in exploring
and reporting their tacit knowledge by externalizing it. Based
on related work on HTTPS usability, e.g., [4], [18], [2] and
recent mental model studies from usable security, e.g., [34],
[35], [36], [28], [30] we constructed an interview guideline for
semi-structured interviews including a three-part drawing task
and a short questionnaire with closed-ended questions cov-
ering demographics and questions on the participants’ online
communication behavior. The complete study material can be
found in the Appendix, including the screening questionnaire
in Section B and the interview guideline in Section C. Twenty-
seven interviews were conducted in person in three different
cities in Austria and Germany, namely Vienna, Bonn, and
Hannover. The participants were invited to a quiet room at
one of our labs or at a local hackerspace. In addition, three
interviews were conducted via Skype.
All participants were informed about the purpose of the
study and then signed a consent form. Then, depending on
whether a participant was classified as end user or adminis-
trator, they were presented a questionnaire. After completion
of the questionnaire, the main part of the study–namely the
interview with the drawing tasks–was conducted. In order to
elicit articulations and visualization of user mental models, the
participants were guided through three drawing tasks based
on different scenarios and asked to verbalize their thought
process as they drew, consistent with traditional think aloud
protocols [39]. The scenarios were (1) a general scenario of
sending an encrypted message to a communication partner, (2)
online shopping via HTTPS, and (3) online banking.
All but one interview were recorded after the participants
gave their written consent. In addition to the audio recordings,
the interviewers took notes.
Contrary to quantitative research, where the appropriate
sample size can be determined by power calculations, the
sample size in qualitative research is determined by the point
at which no new themes or ideas emerge from the data. This
metric is also referred to as saturation [40]. We conducted
interviews until we reached saturation. As the sample of end
users was more diverse in terms of demographics, education
and technical experience (assessed in the screening question-
naire), a larger sample was required to reach saturation in
comparison to the administrator sample. We validated our
study design with pilot interviews and a post-hoc validity
study.
B. Expectations on User Mental Models
While our scientific principles encourage us to evaluate
results from a neutral, non-involved standpoint, researchers
introduce their own individual biases and preconceptions. To
make these personal influences more transparent, we discussed
a series of expectations on mental models prior to analyzing
the data. We argue that mental models of both types of users
are constructed based on the protocols and UX with which
they interact. We therefore expected these components to be
essential parts of their mental models. Mental models are also
influenced by media articles, education, experience, and other
factors. As we cannot isolate these factors, we do not build
our expectations on them.
Consequently, we assumed security indicators (e.g., the
https prefix or the padlock icon) as part of end user mental
models. We did not expect deep knowledge about encryption
concepts and keys, e.g., we did not expect awareness for
metadata from end users or an understanding about additional
network nodes. While all researchers agreed that end users
should not confuse encryption with authentication, we did
not agree on whether the absence of a centralized encryption
component can be expected from end users.
We expected more in-depth knowledge from administrators,
e.g., knowledge about symmetric and asymmetric encryption.
We also expected keys, certificates, and certificate authorities
to be components of their mental models. We also assumed
that their tacit knowledge on data transport routes would
contain intermediary nodes in the network. We expected more
sophisticated threat models and awareness of metadata.
C. Pilot Interviews
Before the actual study, we conducted a series of pilot
interviews, four in Vienna and two in Bonn. The first version
of the interview guideline had only two different drawing
tasks (message encryption in theory and visiting a site with
HTTPS). As the results from our pilot interviews suggest,
this was not enough to elicit a detailed articulation of the
participants’ mental models. We therefore decided to include
a third drawing task (i.e., visiting an online banking site) that,
from a technical perspective, presents a similar scenario but is
often understood as a more security-critical task. Our results
also suggested minor modifications to the order of questions.
D. Recruitment and Participants
In total, we recruited 45 participants. Since the first six and
the last nine interviews were used for the pilot study and for
the validation of the results, we excluded them from the final
data set and thus had a final set of 30 participants, consisting
of 18 end users and 12 administrators, respectively.
For the non-expert users, our goal was to recruit a diverse
sample of participants. Hence, we used three separate recruit-
ing mechanisms to build our sample: mailing lists, online
forums, and personal contacts for recruitment. We especially
limited the number of students in our sample and refrained
from recruiting computer science students or IT professionals.
In contrast, the recruitment criteria for administrators was
that they had to be in charge of administering systems and
regularly-used services. We allowed both paid and voluntary
work.
To recruit administrators, we contacted companies’ IT de-
partments directly (e.g. national newspapers) or used per-
sonal contacts as entry points to larger organizations and
asked them to forward the announcement to their employers’
IT department. Five administrators were recruited over this
channel. Additionally, we posted advertisements on social
media and a hackerspace mailing list to recruit another seven
administrators. Sadly, we were unable to recruit female or
non-binary administrators. Table III lists information of our
participants. Table I presents a summary of demographics.
Table II summarizes the administrators’ previous work
experience and security-specific education. Four of the 12
administrators reported that they never received any security-
specific education. Four administrators were employed at
IT service providers, two at national newspapers, and the
remaining ones were administrating servers in the fields of
data protection, social services, advertisement, mobility, radio
and television, and education. Eleven administrators were full-
time administrators at a company, and one was voluntarily
administrating at a non-profit organization.
The recruitment text did not include information on the
actual purpose of the study in order to prevent the participants
from informing themselves about HTTPS before participation.
All participants were compensated with 10 Euros for their
time.
TABLE I
PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS. TOTAL N = 30;
Demographic End users Administrators
NEnd = 18 NAdmin = 12
Gender
Male 7 (39%) 12 (100%)
Female 11 (61%) 0 (0%)
No Information 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
Age
Min. 24 29
Max. 60 42
Median 28 34
Mean 34 34
Highest Completed Education
Junior high 1 0
High school 4 5
University 13 7
TABLE II
ADMINISTRATORS’ EXPERIENCE, AS ASKED IN THE INTRODUCTORY
QUESTIONNAIRE. TOTAL NAdmins = 12;
Number Percent
Paid admin work 11 92%
Voluntary admin work 1 8%
Special IT-Sec Training 6 50%
Configured HTTPS Before 11 92%
Has written TLS-specific code 4 33%
Fig. 1. Example of a participant drawing (U09). Among other codes, this
drawing was coded with F.5 scribbled line, G.4 local encryption component,
J.5 not part of the model, N.5 model too sparse.
E. Data Analysis
We collected both qualitative and quantitative data. Our
qualitative analysis is based on audio-recordings, hand-written
notes, and the drawings that emerged from the drawing tasks.
For our analysis, we conducted inductive coding [41], [42],
[43], [44], [45], [46] as commonly used to construct models
and theories based on qualitative data in social sciences and
usable security, e.g., [4], [47].
We applied two rounds of open coding to detect observable
patterns. We then performed Strauss and Corbin’s descriptive
axial coding [45] and selective coding to group our data
into categories and models. We also used selective coding
to relate the categories to our research questions. Throughout
the coding process, we used analytic memos to keep track
of thoughts about emerging themes. The final set of codes is
listed in Appendix A.
As a first step, three researchers independently coded all
questions and drawings of mental models. Subsequently, the
resulting codes were discussed and refined to agree on a final
code book. As a second step, two coders independently coded
the data and again conflicts were resolved in discussions. To
code drawings along with the think-aloud protocol, the coders
looked at the drawings and read the audio transcript aloud.
After each item, one or more codes were assigned. Our goal
was to code contextual statements instead of singular entities
of the drawings. Figure 1 shows an example of a drawing and
selected assigned codes.
We calculated Krippendorff’s Alpha [48] to measure the
level of agreement among the coders. Our α = 0.98 indicates
a good level of coding agreement since the value is greater
than 0.8 [48]. A potential reason for the high α lies in
the technical nature of the coding categories that have a
limited scope of interpretation. Irrespective of the high level of
coding agreement and in line with other qualitative research
methodologists, we believe that it is important to elaborate
how and why disagreements in coding arose and to disclose
the insights gained from discussions about them. Each coder
brought a unique perspective on the topic that contributed to a
more complete picture. Most conflicts arose regarding the level
of granularity of a drawing or representation. The conflicts
were resolved based on discussions among all coders and
additional consultation of the protocols and audio transcripts
from the study.
Additionally, three researchers independently performed ax-
ial and selective coding to generate two models and two anti-
models for HTTPS and message encryption. Then, the three
coders met in person to reach agreement on these models and
to resolve conflicts.
Our quantitative analysis is based on the close-ended ques-
tions from the questionnaire. We also evaluate quantitative
aspects based on particular codes.
F. Pilot and Post-hoc Validity Study
We performed a series of pilot interviews to validate our
study design prior to conducting the actual study. However,
due to the lack of available ground truth, our exploratory study
instrument may still be subject to bias and priming effects.
During analysis, we observed that most participants naturally
used the term encryption when articulating their understanding
of HTTPS. Hence, it is natural to suspect a priming effect
due to spatial task arrangement [49]. We conducted a post-
hoc validity study with nine participants (four administrators
[VA1-5] and five end users [VU1-5], demographics are shown
in Figure III) and a different set of warm-up questions and
task ordering. The goal was to completely avoid the word
encryption and let participants start with the HTTPS drawing
tasks. The modified interview guideline is presented in Ap-
pendix D. The additional data was again coded, but no new
codes emerged from these data, indicating that saturation was
reached with the original study protocol. Our results suggest
that the term encryption did not emerge from the interview
questions but is often used and understood as a synonym for
security.
G. Ethical Considerations
Both our institutions located in central Europe do not have
a formal IRB process but a set of guidelines to follow for
this kind of user study. A fundamental requirement of our
universities’ ethics guidelines is to preserve the participants’
privacy and limit the collection of person-related data as much
as possible. Therefore, every study participant was assigned
an ID, which was used throughout the experiment and for
the questionnaire. All participants signed consent forms prior
to participating in our study. The consent form explained the
goal of our research, what we expected from them, and how
the collected data was to be used. The signed consent forms
were stored separately and did not contain the assigned IDs
to make them unlinkable to their real identities. The study
complied with strict national privacy regulations and the EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
IV. RESULTS
In the following we present both quantitative and qualitative
results along with selected direct participant quotes.
A. Mental Models
Our qualitative analysis yielded four different types of
mental models representing the lower and upper bound
of correspondence to the technical concepts of message
encryption (as collected via drawing task 1 and shown in
Figure 2, Figure 3) and HTTPS (as collected via drawing tasks
2 and 3, shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5). In the following,
we provide qualitative descriptions and visualizations of the
models and discuss the differences between administrators
and end users. These differences are color-coded in the
visualizations. Section IV-B discusses quantitative aspects of
these models based on particular codes. The corresponding
codebook can be found in Appendix F.
1) Model of message encryption: This model incorporates
mental representations that correctly abstract the underlying
technology and is shown in Figure 2. The main properties of
this model are
• encryption and decryption are performed on the devices
at the communication end-points,
• the data in transit is protected from attackers and
eavesdroppers,
• the existence of keys is acknowledged, well-articulated
models acknowledge the existence of two different keys
(public and private), and
• that a vaguely defined key exchange process is required.
While this model is conceptually correct and contains
relevant entities of message encryption, the model for
both administrators and end users is sparse when it comes
to the purpose of these entities, especially regarding key
exchange. Ten administrator participants mentioned that a
key exchange via a key server or an in-person meeting needs
to happen before sending encrypted messages, and 10 end
users inferred during their think-aloud process that some
kind of exchange needs to happen prior to communication.
It is also notable that key creation is not at all reflected in
this model. Only one participant vaguely mentioned that
the key should be created at some point without being able
to further articulate how the process works. None of our
participants actually incorporated key creation. Our results
indicate that administrators incorporated public and private
keys more often than end users (as discussed in Section IV-B).
Twenty-three participant drawings reflect properties of this
model (thereof 12 by administrators and 11 by end users).
(public) key exchange
Apublic/ 
Aprivate
Bpublic/ 
Bprivate
(admin-speciﬁc)
Fig. 2. Model of message encryption. Entities that are solely reflecting
administrator mental models are visually highlighted (dashed box in pink).
2) Anti-model of message encryption: Contrary to the (cor-
rect) model, the anti-model incorporates all mental represen-
tations that deviate from the actual components and workflow
of message encryption. The model is shown in Figure 3, and
its key characteristics are
• a centralized authority is a major component of this model
and acts as authentication service, message relay, or
centralized encryption service.
• while encryption is handled by the centralized authority,
decryption is not part of the model.
• data in transit is not protected from attacks.
• keys are not articulated as components. However, a
vaguely defined code is exchanged between the commu-
nication end-points and the centralized service.
Our results suggest that the misconception of a centralized
authority is more common and specific to end user mental
models. Six participant drawings (0 administrators, 6 end
users) feature elements of this anti-model of message
encryption.
centralized crypto/ 
authentication service 
code code
plaintext message
(end user-speciﬁc)
Fig. 3. Anti-model of message encryption. Entities that are solely reflecting
end user mental models are visually highlighted (dashed boxes in blue).
3) Model of HTTPS: The best case model of HTTPS
incorporates correct mental representations of the concept and
components of HTTPS and is shown in Figure 4. Contrary to
the correct model of message encryption, the correct model of
HTTPS does not acknowledge the existence of keys (neither
administrators nor end users mentioned them). This model is
based on the data gathered through drawing tasks 2 and 3. The
main properties of this model are:
• data in transit is encrypted and protected from attacks,
• the existence of a CA, but no awareness of its role and
context,
• the browser is perceived as relevant entity,
• best-case representations contain security indicators like
the “https” prefix or a lock icon.
• (Mostly) administrators’ mental representations contain
protocol-related tasks such as certificate checks, TLS
handshakes, or HTTP GET requests that are articulated
as check lists without any further understanding of their
purposes and the involved entities.
Similar to the correct model of message encryption, this
model contains multiple nodes between sender and receiver.
Administrators’ mental models generally contained more
entities (e.g., CA’s, different devices) and protocol-related
tasks. Nineteen participant drawings substantially overlap
with the correct model of HTTPS; 12 were articulated by
administrators and seven by end users.
cert check, TLS handshake, HTTP GET, ...
Server
CA
or
(admin-speciﬁc)
Fig. 4. Model of HTTPS. Entities that are solely reflecting administrator
mental models are visually highlighted (dashed boxed in pink).
4) Anti-model of HTTPS: In contrast to the correct model
of HTTPS but similar to the incorrect model of message
encryption, the characteristics of this model are as follows:
• a centralized blackbox HTTPS proxy is responsible for
authentication and/or encryption.
• the user’s browser sends a request/message along with
a code to the HTTPS proxy. The code is used to encrypt
the data.
• if more security is required (e.g., in the case of online
banking), the user sends an additional second factor to
the HTTPS proxy, which then adds an additional layer
of encryption.
• decryption is not part of the model. The server/website
receives encrypted data, but it is unclear how it is then
processed.
• omnipotent attackers such as intelligence agencies and
surveillance programs, “hackers” but also ad trackers can
attack the HTTPS proxy and eavesdrop information.
• cookies (represented by a gingerbread figure) may leak
information via the browser.
• smartphone apps are generally perceived as insecure,
regardless of whether HTTPS is used or not.
End users, especially, (8 participants) thought that mobile
devices and apps are not safe to be used in this context, as
sensitive information may be leaked. Also, the idea of multiple
layers of encryption using a code and an additional 2nd
factor was mostly part of end user mental models. Omnipotent
attackers and a fairly negative security assessment are part
of both administrators’ and end users’ mental models. This
model underestimates the security of HTTPS and does not
contain keys, certificates, or security indicators. Interestingly,
this is the only of the four meta-models that acknowledges
the existence of metadata. Twelve participant drawings feature
elements from this incorrect model of HTTPS (10 end user
models and 2 administrator models also contained elements
of this model).
B. Mental Model Components and Emerging Themes
We discuss themes and particular aspects that emerged
during the drawing tasks and corresponding think-aloud
protocol. Table IV shows a selection of quantitative results
Online
Shopping
Site
Bank
plaintext 
message 
HTTPS
Proxy 
(Blackbox) 
code
X1%
X1% 
ZYX
2nd factor
intelligence agencies,  
ad trackers, hackers 
(end user-speciﬁc)
Fig. 5. Anti-model of HTTPS. Entities that are solely reflecting end user
mental models are visually highlighted.
per assigned codes where differences between groups are
particularly interesting. The codes in parenthesis refer to the
category codes (see Appendix F).
1) User Expectations of Security Tools: When asked of
which encrypted tools, apps or devices they were aware,
end users mostly referred to mobile apps (15 participants) and
sensitive services such as banking services (14 participants)
or phone calls (1 participant). At the same time, nine end
users self-reported a lack of knowledge (see blue bars in
Figure 9). In contrast, administrators (red bars) mentioned
a broad spectrum of tools and applications, ranging from
browsers (7 participants), email services (7 participants), and
privacy preserving technologies such as VPN, SSH or Tor
(6 participants) to local encryption such as disk encryption
(1 participant) and remote encryption such as servers (4
participants). Interestingly, 8 end-users and 2 administrators
explicitly stated that mobile apps are generally not encrypted
and hence, untrustworthy. One end user (U04) reported
to avoid mobile apps to handle sensitive data and that he
accesses sensitive services, such as online banking, solely via
the browser on his PC. This is in line with findings by Chin
et al. [50] showing that users are commonly apprehensive
about running sensitive tasks on their phones. Notably, eight
non-experts and two administrators specifically brought up
WhatsApp as a negative example of an application that is
not or only partly encrypted. This implies that either the
messaging app’s initiative to offer end-to-end encryption did
not yet reach all of its users or that users do not trust the
service.
2) Mistrust in HTTPS and Browser Security Indicators:
When it comes to expectations of visiting a site with
HTTPS, nine end users reported a lack of knowledge, and
some even claimed that they have never noticed the security
indicator before as shown in Figure 6. One participant mixed
up the HTTPS lock symbol with user authentication resp.
authorization:
“I think the lock symbol means that I have to authen-
ticate myself. As I frequently forget my passwords, I
usually try to click around to get rid of this symbol.”
(U12)
Fig. 6. Reported expectations on HTTPS. Each bar indicates how often a
certain category was named in relation to all namings. (Multiple mentions
per participant)
This shows that users still do not properly recognize the
HTTPS security indicator, although much work has focused
on improvements in this area. End users described their
expectation of HTTPS on a superficial level, using general
terms related to security and eavesdropping protection without
further elaboration. Three participants wrongly assumed that
HTTPS would protect against phishing, and one participant
thought that HTTPS could ban viruses. Interestingly, one end
user stated that
“HTTPS prevents people from seeing what their
partner did on the Internet or the employer from
seeing whether employees were not working when
they should have been.” (U12)
None of the end users mentioned server authentication.
In contrast, six administrators named end-to-end encryption
and five server authentication. However, we observed that
administrators described the two concepts decoupled from
each other, which is in accordance with the finding from Fahl
et al. [10] that administrators are not aware of the necessity
of server authentication when establishing a secure encrypted
channel.
Another emerging topic was mistrust in the security in-
dicator and mistrust in HTTPS as a protocol. Generally,
we were surprised about the high frequency of expressed
mistrust against HTTPS and the security indicator coming
from both end users (7 participants) and administrators (6
participants). One administrator stated that HTTPS does not
offer eavesdropping protection, claiming
“The lock symbol does not mean anything, it is pure
marketing”. (A06)
After this statement, we asked the participant a series of
follow-up questions to allow him to clarify. As a result, the
participant referred to powerful attackers and large (govern-
ment) organizations and said that the arms race with powerful
attackers is almost impossible to win for defenders.
Another dominant theme was the underestimation of the
security benefits of HTTPS. For example, one end user
articulated
“The lock symbol puts security in people’s mind
with the purpose to build up trust. This does not
mean that the website is secure.” (P01)
As discussed by Felt et al. [18], security indicators are
a critical UI component of modern browsers. The results
from our study, however, suggest that security indicators
are rarely part of user mental models. Twenty participants
did not include security indicators in their drawings and the
associated think-aloud protocol. One participant explicitly
used an insecurity indicator in their drawing (note that the
interviews were conducted shortly before Chrome started
notifying users of unencrypted connections). The other
participants referred to either the lock icon (5) and/or the
HTTPS prefix (5) in their drawings.
3) Perceived Security Benefits of HTTPS: With respect to
security perceptions, the elicited mental models were rather
diverse. Eight out of the 18 end users from our study clearly
underestimated the security benefit of HTTPS. Six end users
had a realistic assessment of the security of HTTPS and
understood that HTTPS encrypts the entire transport layer
instead of just single data elements such as a username and a
password, or a credit card number. U09 explicitly stated that
he had no deeper understanding of keys, certificates, and other
system components, but had a (correct) basic understanding of
the underlying concept of transport layer encryption.
In the context of the two HTTPS-related drawing tasks, the
participant said:
“I expect the connection to the online shop to be
secure (or insecure), irrespective of whether I want
to buy a pen or a house.” (U09)
A few participants also misunderstood the security benefits
of HTTPS and assumed that it prevents any form of data
leakage (2 non-experts) and can even prevent phishing attacks
(3 non-experts). One participant imagined HTTPS to be a
completely encapsulated system where all attempts to attack
the sensitive information are bounced off.
“HTTPS inhibits tracking, it is a completely encap-
sulated system that does not share the data.” (U03)
Another participant (end user) perceived HTTPS as a tunnel
between him and a server:
“The connection between me and the server goes via
a tunnel, and attempts to attack the data bounce off”
(U09)
One administrator, also, described HTTPS and the attacker
model as a tunnel:
“SSL is like a tunnel, and data can be pushed
through this tunnel.” (A04)
Irrespective of security indicators, many participants ex-
pressed general distrust towards encrypted connections.
“I always feel queasy, anyway. Nothing on the
Internet is secure.” (U01)
While for some types of attacks (e.g. phishing, malicious
Javascript, or drive-by downloads) this is a true statement, this
was not the type of attack to which the participants typically
referred. Surprisingly, most participants questioned the protec-
tion mechanisms against attacks that HTTPS can protect them
against (e.g., third parties stealing their passwords/credit card
numbers when submitting a web form to an online shop).
Seven non-experts and six administrators expressed
general doubts about whether cryptography can achieve
what it promises. However, the participants considered
cryptography necessary to protect various assets. Thirteen
out of 18 end users mentioned sensitive data related to
purchases or personal information as crucial to be protected
by cryptography. Administrators again showcased a more
diverse idea, referring to sensitive data (2 participants),
protocol specific data (1 participant), as well as local data
(1 participant) or data in transit (2 participants). Both end
users and administrators had a similar picture of successful
attackers, believing that the state respectively the police
or secret service (26 participants) as well as hackers (19
participants) and big companies such as Apple, Facebook, or
Google (18 participants) are the most persistent attackers.
4) Centralized Components and Authorities: Another
emerging theme was centralization vs. decentralization and
powerful authorities. Eleven end users included a centralized
encryption entity in their drawings, i.e., a remote service that
is responsible for encryption and then forwards the encrypted
data to the communication partner (as in the first scenario)
or to the online shop (second scenario). In other models, the
centralized component acted as a message release point that
1) checks the message for suspicious content and validity, 2)
encrypts it, and then 3) forwards it to the receiver. Comparing
our findings to related work, we observe that end users
perceive other de-centralized cryptographic tools as centralized
systems, e.g., Tor [35] or use centralized components since
they are perceived as more trustworthy, e.g., hosted wallets to
manage bitcoins [51].
An interesting observation is that only one participant
(U08) included key generation in their model. All other
participants implicitly or explicitly assumed that the key was
already there by default and did not include key generation in
their models. Only a few participants discussed key exchange
as part of their drawing and explanation as shown in Table IV.
5) Authentication vs. Encryption: Furthermore, misconcep-
tions about the differences between encryption and authenti-
cation emerged as a theme for both groups of participants.
Both end users and administrators from our sample confused
encryption with authentication. In general, 13 users expressed
concerns regarding the protocol’s security promises. Especially
when it comes to 2-Factor-Authentication (2FA), a common
misconception of end users was that the secondary factor was
used to add an additional layer of encryption. Participant U11
argued that 2FA is required for online banking to compensate
the lack of security provided by HTTPS.
“HTTPS is a bad protocol. If HTTPS were secure,
I wouldn’t need 2FA.” (U11)
6) Differences between Administrators and End Users: For
both groups of participants, mental models were diverse even
among experienced administrators.
When asked about how they think encryption works in
theory, 10 of 12 administrator drawings reflected concepts
of end-to-end encryption. In comparison, fewer than 50% of
the end user drawings clearly depicted end-to-end encryption.
Four end users incorporated symmetric keys in their drawings
and two explicitly mentioned private and public keys without
being able to further elaborate why two keys are necessary. In
contrast, seven administrators explicitly referred to asymmetric
encryption in their drawings and the think-aloud protocol.
More than half of the end user mental models referred to a
third party that acts as encryption entity or proxy, or, referred
to encryption as a blackbox. One participant (U03) used
ephemeral keys and anther one (U15) thought that encryption
was the same thing as obfuscation and steganography. In
contrast, none of the administrators’ drawings reflected such
misconceptions.
While comparing the differences between administrators
and end users, a theme emerged, protocol-based vs. concep-
tual. Our results suggest that expert mental models are mostly
protocol-based instead of conceptual compared to non-experts.
Most administrators were familiar with specific protocol char-
acteristics, such as which messages are exchanged between
server and client and how connections are established.
When asked to explain the underlying concepts, most ad-
ministrators were unable to explain how HTTPS works and
had sparse mental models of the underlying fundamentals
and their interplay. This was often the case even for the
first drawing task, which asked participants to depict how
sending an encrypted message through any channel works in
theory. Even in such a straight-forward scenario for knowl-
edgeable users, some administrators showed and even admitted
significant knowledge gaps. However, we also observed that
administrators concealed these gaps more frequently and ran-
domly dropped associated technical terms without being able
to explain what they mean. Some participants, though (such
as A09), explicitly admitted major knowledge gaps:
“How HTTPS works... those are the things that I
always forget. You should have asked me five years
ago.” (A09)
Another example of an administrator lacking conceptual
knowledge but getting stuck on a configuration detail was
participant A4, who said:
“I am really not sure how Firefox validates certifi-
cates, but I know that Chrome uses the Windows
Root CA.” (A4)
In general, our results suggest that the administrators’ level
of expertise is rather diverse, much like that of end user
participants. While some had sparse and incomplete mental
models of encryption or HTTPS in particular (e.g., A09, A10,
A11), some were confident and able to articulate how HTTPS
works in a very detailed and accurate way.
7) Mental Model Evolution: Figure 8 in the Appendix
shows the mental model refinement over time across the three
drawing tasks. The refinement between the first and second
drawing task was equally distributed across our participants.
In contrast, 26 participants had a constant level of detail of
their mental models across drawing tasks 2 and 3.
8) Terminology and Visualization Components: While most
administrators used technical terminology to elicit their mental
models, end users sometimes created new terminology to com-
pensate for missing technical terms in their vocabulary. The
most frequently used technical term by the administrators was
cipher followed by session key and hash. Twelve participants
did not include a visualization of the encrypted message in
their drawings. Five participants represented the encrypted
message as scrambled text or numbers, four used a lock icon,
three drew physical objects like an envelope or a treasure chest,
and three marked the encrypted message with a different color.
Others used scribbled lines, a different language, or chopped
text.
For the first drawing task, 20 participants used an abstract
example scenario. The remainder used an arbitrary messaging
app or referred to apps and tools they knew from their
everyday lives (Signal, WhatsApp, PGP/GPG).
Twenty-one participants clearly understood the connection
between drawing tasks 2 (visiting an online shop) and 3
(visiting a bank’s website).
Our results also suggest that only three participants were
aware of the existence and associated risks of (unencrypted)
metadata.
Regarding mental models of HTTPS, we classified 12
models as clearly conceptual, seven as protocol-based, and
two with both conceptual and protocol-specific components.
The remaining nine models were too sparse to classify them.
Ten participants explicitly admitted their knowledge gaps and
eight participants tried to cover them.
9) Structure-Behavior-Function (SBF) Model: The
Structure-Behavior-Function (SBF) framework was proposed
by Goel et al. [52] to describe complex systems based on
three pillars: (1) structure (system components), (2) behavior
(change of the system over time), and (3) function (effect of
the system on the environment). It is often used by cognitive
psychologists to describe mental models and compare them
to actual system descriptions.
Hmelo-Silver et al. [53] applied the SBF framework in order
to model novices and experts’ understandings of complex
systems. They found that the novices’ system perceptions
mostly focused on concrete aspects related to the structure of
the system, often simplifying causality and assuming central
control. In contrast, experts were more likely to discuss
behavioral aspects.
Applying this model to HTTPS, we model an end user’s
computer or a server hosting a web page as structural com-
Fig. 7. Attacker models in participant drawings. Each bar indicates how many
percent of all drawings feature a certain attacker type.
ponents. We model behavioral aspects as perceivable browser
indications, such as warning messages or security indicators.
Functional aspects comprise authentication of end users and
encryption of the communication path, resulting in a protection
against various attack vectors such as eavesdropping or traffic
injection.
The results from our study suggest similar trends to those
presented by Hmelo-Silver et al. [53]. End users’ represen-
tations frequently include structural aspects and assume a
central entity pursuing encryption. Furthermore, the end users
from our study rarely included descriptions of behavioral or
functional aspects, showing neither that their perception of
security indicators is particularly strong nor that they are aware
of the actual purpose of HTTPS.
In contrast, the administrators largely focused on behavioral
aspects and delivered abstract representations of state transi-
tions (such as sequence diagrams of protocols). Nevertheless,
the administrators’ system descriptions are lacking functional
aspects. The administrators furthermore described the proto-
col behavior mainly decoupled from its actual purpose. An
interesting observation from our study is that none of our
expert participants clearly pointed out at which point of the
protocol execution the encryption starts. Hence, our results
show that neither end users nor administrators are able to link
the structural aspects of HTTPS and behavioral aspects to the
actual function that the protocol achieves.
C. Threat Models
After the participants finished all three drawing tasks, we
asked them a set of warm-up questions about attacker models
followed by another drawing task asking a participant to mark
where an attacker could eavesdrop. We coded these vulnerable
components and present the results in Figure 7.
The most mentioned component believed to be vulnerable
to attacks were the communication endpoints, which 26 of
54 end user drawings and 10 of 35 expert drawings featured.
Besides the endpoints, many end users stated that attackers
could eavesdrop everywhere within the communication pro-
cess, while expert users tended to differentiate more and name
concrete attackers or attack models.
Most participants visualized the attackers with arrows or
circles indicating the vulnerable components of their drawings.
However, some participants chose to insert attackers with a
drawn representation, e.g., a set of eyes (A08), exclamation
marks (A11), or stick figures as actual shoulder surfers (A10).
Especially regarding the endpoint attackers, not only were
malware or infected devices given as the enablers of eaves-
dropping, but also shoulder surfing (A10) and actual violence
against human users (A11).
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we discuss our findings and derive potential
implications on correct, incorrect, and sparse models (where
essential components are missing for cases which put users
directly at security or privacy risks).
Our analysis of mental models of HTTPS indicates dif-
ferences between the two groups of participants. While ad-
ministrator mental models were generally protocol-based and
correct even if sparse, the mental models of end users were
sometimes not only sparse but simply wrong or non-existent.
Indeed, our user study was an opportunity for some end
users to think about HTTPS and web encryption for the first
time. However, we argue that fine-grained and fully correct
mental models can and should not be expected from end users
and partly not even from knowledgeable administrators. Thus,
the following discussion places emphasis on misconceptions
which crucially interfere with a secure and privacy preserv-
ing usage or configuration of HTTPS as well as actionable
conclusions to mitigate these risks.
We also observed interesting corner cases which should not
be ignored when discussing consolidated findings. Examples
of such corner cases include contradictions, the confusion
of authentication and encryption, or the assumption that
publicly-available comments (i.e., consumer ratings) are not
sent encrypted since this would prevent other consumers from
reading them in plaintext. In contrast to the lower bounds
of comprehension, we also found examples for the higher
levels, e.g., an administrator who had a deep understanding
of technical and operational details.
A. Implications from Correct Mental Models
The condensed representations of correct models show that
participants of both user groups have a basic understanding of
end-to-end encryption. In addition, the threat awareness was
better than we initially expected. Many end users were aware
that communication endpoints are often vulnerable (e.g. inse-
cure devices like smartphones). This is a realistic assessment,
since many smartphone vendors cease to ship security updates
for their devices long before they reach their end of life. In
contrast, administrators seem to focus on sophisticated but
rare attacks, such as “man-in-the-middle.” This may indicate
an influence of tech news outlets and scientific publications
which usually focus on more sophisticated attackers. Overall,
we regard this as a benevolent effect since administrators
should be aware of these attack types in order to deploy
adequate countermeasures, and end users are currently held
responsible for managing the security of their devices through,
for example, regular OS and app updates.
Our results also indicate that mental models of end users
may be influenced by media and marketing campaigns as
the comprehension of message encryption (task 1) was often
higher than the understanding of general HTTPS-encrypted
traffic in web browsers. We hypothesize that one reason for
this difference may be higher media coverage of message
encryption in comparison to HTTPS. In addition, several app
manufactures (e.g., WhatsApp) specifically point out end-to-
end encryption when users start a new conversation.
Finally, the pictorial representations of mental models indi-
cate interesting differences between end users and administra-
tors: while end users’ correct models were rather conceptual,
administrators’ models were mostly protocol-related and often
illustrated operational details. The protocol-based representa-
tions reminded us of flow charts common to academic lectures
and online tutorials, suggesting that many administrators tried
to recall previously-seen educational material.
However, there is still room for improvement, since even
correct representations were often sparse. For example, only
the best representations pointed out security indicators, and
important aspects like key exchange and certification authori-
ties (CA) were hardly mentioned. Overall, the correct mental
models indicate that media coverage, marketing, and education
can help in forming folk models, even for complex processes
like HTTPS.
B. Implications from Incorrect Mental Models
While correct mental models emphasized the value of end-
to-end encryption, participants with incorrect mental models
tended to underestimate the security benefits of HTTPS and
furthermore assume that omnipotent attackers can eavesdrop
at multiple stages of online communication. We hypothesize
that this might be the result of press attention on misuse of
SSL/TLS in mobile apps created by the work of Fahl et al.
[10] and Cothia et al, among others. [19]. Consequently, end
users are incapable of making informed security decisions as
they do not trust the protocol in even its best-case config-
uration. As a consequence, end users do not demand proper
configurations. Even though WhatsApp was already mentioned
as an example of an application which explicitly advertises
end-to-end encryption, some users might not even recognize
such notifications (or simply mistrust them) as WhatsApp was
constantly mentioned as an example for an app being not or
only partly encrypted. While this seems to not prevent users
from using WhatsApp, it shows that the security benefits of
end-to-end encryption are often not perceived as such.
Even more worrisome, we identified corner cases of in-
correct mental models which may directly put users at risk.
For example, one end user thought that HTTPS can protect
against phishing web sites. Such assumptions may lead to an
unjustified sense of security whenever HTTPS connections are
indicated by the browser. We also found that end users were
often not aware of security indicators or they were perceived
as unimportant. Overall, the results show that the end users’
interest in these indicators is mitigated by general mistrust
in the protocol (i.e., the belief that cryptography/HTTPS
cannot prevent attacks and eavesdropping). Similarly, we
found that many users are not impressed by warnings of
insecure connections, since they do not trust the protocol
in the first place. While administrators generally have more
correct mental models, their representations frequently lacked
important parts and meaningful interconnections. Also, the
administrators’ statements indicated a high level of mistrust.
As an example, one administrator (A06) claimed that “The
lock symbol does not mean anything, it is pure marketing”.
Additionally, administrators frequently expressed mistrust in
the PKI system. These two facts might explain a diminished
interest in configuring certificates correctly.
In summary, the incorrect mental models indicate that end
users do not trust the security that HTTPS can offer if deployed
in a best-case working scenario. We argue that recent news
reports about intelligence activities influenced perceptions
about omnipotent attackers and that users need to build up
trust before concepts like security indicators and warnings
can be effective. The multi-step approach of our user study
indicates that education and brain teasers can be promising in
that they helped many users adjust their mental models even
if considering some aspects of HTTPS for the first time. For
example, we observed that thinking about threat models caused
participants to review and refine their mental model drawings
in some cases. End user participant U12 stated, “Now I see
that I didn’t think logically” before revising her drawing for
task 1. The same was true for administrators who became more
aware of metadata leakage after being asked about potential
attacks.
C. Implications from Missing and Sparse Mental Models
In addition to correct and incorrect mental models, interest-
ing implications can be derived from sparse models, as well.
We found that keys and certificates are not part of the correct
conceptional representations of most mental models, which
implies that users do not understand their purpose within
the concept. We argue that not being aware of their purpose
reduces the chance that users verify certificates manually. The
same is true for keys in other application scenarios: it is no
surprise that key verification in mobile messaging apps is
rarely performed, as users are not aware of its necessity nor the
underlying threat model that this measure protects them from.
Helping users understand the functional perspective of keys
and certificates in HTTPS and encrypted messaging is thus
one of the main challenges for future research. While not all
conceptual parts need to be understood by users, it is essential
that users are motivated to engage measures demanded by the
security concept.
Even though some administrators mentioned keys and cer-
tificates with respect to HTTPS, they tended to use them
as buzzwords in their articulations and were often unable
to explain how these components contribute to a secure
configuration. In addition, we found that most administrators
were not aware that server authentication is a prerequisite for
establishing a securely encrypted channel (which corresponds
to the results from Fahl et al. [10]).
D. Potential Countermeasures and Improvements
While our data does not provide direct evidence for
this, we hypothesize that education and online tutorials
contribute to these mental models. This corresponds to the
findings from Krombholz et al. [4], who showed that even
administrators who successfully configure HTTPS strongly
rely on online sources as they do not have a full understanding
of the underlying concepts. For end users, our results have
implications on security indicators, warnings and other UX
cues that are designed to assist users in making informed
security decisions.
1) Suggested Workflow Changes for Tools and APIs: We
found that administrators often do not understand the interplay
of functional protocol components (e.g. the CA, certificates
for E2E, keys). In particular, our results suggest that the
role of certificates and PKI as a whole for setting up an
encrypted channel are poorly understood by administrators
which indicates that administrators could benefit from a de-
ployment process which more clearly illustrates the linkage
between these components, resp. hides this complexity from
them. Hence, as keys and certificates remain important func-
tional components even in more user-friendly deployment
concepts such as Let’s Encrypt2 and Certbot3, it is necessary
to provide tangible explanations to make their contribution
to a secure configuration more intuitive. We acknowledge
that Let’s Encrypt and the ACME Protocol offer promising
usability enhancements from the administrators’ point of view,
since they enable automatic issuance of certificates. However,
these initiatives mainly simplify the process of obtaining a
certificate, but do not completely obviate the need for its
users to deal with certificates, keys and additional hardening
measures. As our results show that the biggest challenge for
administrators is to put these different components together in
order to deploy a secure authenticated-encryption mechanism,
we suggest that future protocol designs should aim at hiding
this additional complexity from users.
Although we expected that server authentication was part of
user mental models, our results suggest that this is rarely the
case. Hence, the concept of server authentication along with its
importance for communication security needs to be reflected
in the user interface in order to make server authentication
part of user mental models. Such UI components should also
motivate users to verify the server’s authenticity.
An example for a promising starting point in this regard is
the NaCl API presented by [54], which provides one simple
function referred to as crypto box that comprises several
functionality for authenticating and encrypting a message.
2https://letsencrypt.org – accessed: 05/08/2018.
3https://certbot.eff.org – accessed: 05/08/2018.
2) Trust Establishment: Our results suggest that especially
end users need UX cues that help to construct valid mental
models, as these are important to establish trust in the protocol
and its security properties. In order to deal with general mis-
trust towards HTTPS, we argue that the protocols in today’s
Internet ecosystem and the upcoming Internet of Things should
provide state of the art encryption by default and that insecure
protocols such as HTTP should be abandoned to establish a
more user-friendly distinction between best-case security and
vulnerable connections. Also, a security-by-default state would
obviate the need for users to regularly check HTTPS-specific
UI components. For end users, mistrust in the protocol and
misconceptions about the role of certificates can lead to wrong
decisions when warnings are displayed, putting users at danger
of privacy and security violation. This is in-line with latest
innovations enforced by Google4, who at the time of writing
began to roll out a new version of the web browser Chrome not
showing any security indicators for HTTPS secured websites
anymore. At the same time, websites still using HTTP are
marked as insecure by displaying a red insecurity indicator
in the address bar. Google argued that users should expect a
secure Internet by default, which is in-line with our findings.
Also, our results suggest that security indicators are often not
part of end user mental models, which is why we agree with
Google’s less ubiquitous yet more precise risk communication
with indicators.
VI. LIMITATIONS
While we refrained from recruiting computer science stu-
dents, our sampling method still has limitations. We aimed to
recruit a diverse sample of users, however our sample is still
skewed towards the more educated social class. Furthermore,
our end user sample skewed female, but we did not manage to
recruit a single non-male administrator. Sadly, female adminis-
trators are very rare in our region. Our sample was recruited in
Central Europe which is generally privacy-aware, and HTTPS
adoption rates are generally higher than e.g., in Japan [2]. Our
results are therefore impacted by cultural effects. As research
on perceptions of cryptographic tools and algorithms is still in
its early stages, we followed an inductive approach and opted
for a qualitative study to construct models and theory grounded
in the data. Naturally, our methodology also has its limitations.
The data is self-reported and qualitative in nature. While
our sample is still sufficiently large to perform basic statistic
tests, further investigations are necessary to determine large-
scale effects and hence obtain significant results with larger
effect sizes. We refrained from asking closed-ended knowledge
questions. Also, the results from our pre-study showed that
participants like to litter buzzwords which is why we designed
our study to get a deeper context of their understanding. Our
goal was to allow our participants to openly articulate how they
think the protocol works. We decided to group our participants
based on their role of being an administrator instead of their
4https://blog.chromium.org/2018/05/evolving-chromes-security-indicators.
html
knowledge to avoid biasing effects by previously defined
answer options.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented the first qualitative study on user
mental models of HTTPS. In examining 18 end users and
12 administrators, our approach revealed four types of user
mental models of HTTPS and (abstract) message encryption.
We furthermore revealed misconceptions about threat models
and protocol components that lead to decisions that influence
the security of the systems and, as a result, directly put users
at risk.
Additionally, we shed light on differences between end
users’ and administrators’ perceptions; while end user mental
models were mostly conceptual, administrators’ mental models
frequently contained protocol components and technical terms
without accompanying understanding of their functionality
and purpose within the protocol configuration. Among other
insights, our findings suggest that 1) many users confuse
encryption with authentication, 2) end users assume the om-
nipotence of attackers and significantly underestimate the
security benefits of HTTPS, and 3) many users of both types
generally ignore or even distrust security indicators.
Our work reveals reasons for the usability challenges deter-
mined by Krombholz et al. [4] that are often responsible for
vulnerable HTTPS configurations. Our results, furthermore,
explain why users often fail to correctly assess the implications
of clicking through warnings. And, finally, we provide founda-
tions for future designs of cryptographic protocols that are eas-
ier for administrators and developers to deploy or implement
related code in the most secure manner and therefore minimize
the exposure of end users to security-critical decisions when
communicating online.
As future work, it remains to show how our findings can be
used to inform the design of future cryptographic protocols.
We think that our results can inform a larger (quantitative)
study which could make use of closed-ended questions. Such
future work could also include questions on administrator
qualifications and knowledge questions to measure large-scale
effects and to perform multivariate analyses.
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APPENDIX
A. Additional Tables and Figures
same level of detail
increased level of detail
decreased level of detail
Drawing Task 1 Drawing Task 2 Drawing Task 3
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Fig. 8. Development of user mental models across the 3 drawing tasks.
TABLE III
STUDY PARTICIPANTS (ADMINISTRATORS, END USERS, PILOT/VALIDITY
STUDY PARTICIPANTS)
ID Age Gender Education Employment IT-education
Administrators (NA = 12)
A01 29 m high school employed no
A02 40 m university self-employed no
A03 29 m university employed yes
A04 34 m high school employed no
A05 nA m university employed yes
A06 42 m high school employed no
A07 31 m university employed no
A08 35 m high school employed yes
A09 31 m university employed yes
A10 31 m high school employed no
A11 37 m university employed yes
A12 30 m university employed yes
End users (NU = 18)
U01 56 f junior high self-employed no
U02 24 m high school self-employed no
U03 24 f high school employed/student no
U04 41 m university employed no
U05 26 f university employed no
U06 35 f university employed/student no
U07 43 f university employed no
U08 28 f university employed no
U09 60 m university employed no
U10 27 m university student no
U11 24 m university student no
U12 56 f university employed no
U13 28 f university employed no
U14 32 f university student no
U15 28 m university employed yes
U16 24 f high school employed/student no
U17 27 f university employed no
U18 28 m high school employed no
Pilot study participants (NP = 6)
P01 36 m university employed no
P02 28 f university employed no
P03 28 f high school employed no
P04 21 m high school employed no
P05 36 f university employed yes
P06 29 m junior high employed no
Validity study participants (NV = 9)
VA1 24 m university employed no
VA2 36 m university employed no
VA3 27 m high school employed no
VA4 40 m high school self-employed yes
VU1 52 f university employed no
VU2 27 m high school employed no
VU3 30 m university employed yes
VU4 23 f university employed/student no
VU5 24 f university employed/student no
TABLE IV
SELECTION OF MENTIONED CONCEPTS AND IDENTIFIED CODES. PERCENTAGES MAY NOT SUM TO 100 AS SOME PARTICIPANTS MENTIONED MULTIPLE
ASPECTS. P VALUES ARE CALCULATED WITH TWO-SIDED FISHER’S EXACT TESTS COMPARING END USERS AND ADMINS, φ DENOTES THE MEAN SQUARE
CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT. LINES WHERE p < 0.05 ARE HIGHLIGHTED IN GREY.
Code End users % Admins % Total % φ (if p < 0.05 )
Cryptographic concepts
End-to-end (B.1) 11 61,1% 12 100,0% 23 76,7% φ = 0.45
Symmetric encryption (B.2) 3 16,7% 3 25,0% 6 20,0%
Assymmetric encryption (B.3) 1 5,6% 8 66,7% 9 30,0% φ = 0.1
Blackbox (B.6) 2 11,1% 0 0,0% 2 6,7%
Obfuscation or steganography (B.7) 2 11,1% 0 0,0% 2 6,7%
Authentication (B.8) 1 5,6% 0 0,0% 1 3,3%
Model too sparse (B.9) 5 27,8% 4 33,3% 9 30,0%
Key generation and exchange
Web of trust (D.2) 0 0,0% 1 8,3% 1 3,3%
PSK: key server (D.3) 1 5,6% 1 8,3% 2 6,7%
PSK: in-person key exchange (D.4) 2 11,1% 3 25,0% 5 16,7%
PSK: undefined (D.6) 2 11,1% 6 50,0% 8 26,7%
Shared knowledge (D.5) 3 16,7% 0 0,0% 3 10,0%
Model too sparse (D.1) 11 61,1% 3 25,0% 14 46,7%
Security indicators
HTTPS (J.1) 4 22,2% 3 25,0% 7 23,3%
Lock icon (J.2) 3 16,7% 5 41,7% 8 26,7%
Checkmark (J.3) 0 0,0% 2 16,7% 2 6,7%
Insecurity indicators (J.4) 0 0,0% 1 8,3% 1 3,3%
No indicator (J.5) 13 72,2% 7 58,3% 20 66,7%
Perceived security benefit of HTTPS
Underestimated (K.1) 8 44,4% 1 8,3% 9 30,0% φ = −0.39
Realistic assessment (K.3) 6 33,3% 6 50,0% 12 40,0%
Model too sparse (K.4) 3 16,7% 6 50,0% 9 30,0%
No control (K.5) 1 5,6% 1 8,3% 2 6,7%
Meta observations
More buzzwords (T.1) 3 16.7% 7 58.3% 10 33.3% φ = −0.43
Conceptual model (V.2) 10 55.6% 3 25.0% 13 43.3%
Protocol-based model (V.1) 1 5.6% 6 50.5% 7 23.3% φ = −0.51
Third Parties
Centr. encryption/auth. service (M.1, M.9) 11 61.1% 0 0.0% 11 36.7% φ = −0.62
Fig. 9. Reported knowledge of encrypted tools, apps or devices. Each bar
indicates how often a certain category was named in relation to all namings.
(Multiple mentions per participant)
B. Screening Questionnaire
Demographics:
• Age/ Gender/ Profession/ Highest completed level of
education/ Recent professional status
• Do you have an IT-security background? If yes, please
specify: ...
• Are you a software developer? If yes, since:...
• Are you a system administrator? If yes, since: ...
• Technical Score: I have a good understanding of Com-
puters and the Internet: Likert Scale from 1 (agree) - 7
(disagree)
• I often ask other people for help when I am having
problems with my computer: Likert Scale from 1 (agree)
- 7 (disagree)
• I am often asked for help when other people have
problems with their computer. Likert Scale from 1 (agree)
- 7 (disagree)
1) Technology use:
• Which of the following technologies and services below
have you used in the past year? (Check all that apply.)
– Social Networks (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
LinkedIn, etc)
– Online Audio and Video Conferencing (Skype, Face-
Time, Google Hangout, etc.)
– Office Software (Word, Excel, PowerPoint, etc.)
– Mobile Messaging (Signal, Threema, Whatsapp, etc.)
– Online Banking
– Online Shopping (Amazon, Zalando, etc.)
Expert-specific questions:
• Have you ever written non-browser TLS code? (e.g. for
TLS certificate validation?)
• Have you ever configured HTTPS?
• How long have you been working as admin/developer?
• How big is the company that you are working for?
• What is your company’s scope?
• Security plays an important role in my everday work.
(7-point-Likert, strongly agree - strongly disagree)
• When you are confronted with security-critical decision,
do you make them mostly alone or mostly with a team?
C. Interview Protocol
General:
• In your daily life, are you aware of any tools, apps or
devices where cryptography is used?
• why do you choose to use them?
• Was cryptography part of your education?
• If yes, where did you learn about it? If possible, briefly
outline the basic content and topics that you heard of.
• What are your expectations when you visit a site with
HTTPS and you see the green lock next to the URL in
your browser?
• What is encryption?
1) Mental Models: In the following, I’m going to ask you
to explain your perceptions and ideas about how encryption
on the Internet works. The purpose of this interview is to
understand your views, opinions, and understanding regarding
how encryption works with respect to the technology you use
in your everyday life. Please keep in mind that there is no
correct answer to these questions - please just answer these
questions based on your knowledge and experiences. Also,
please think aloud and explain your thought process while
drawing.
• Phase 1: encryption in theory. Please draw a picture
of how you think encryption works, when you send an
encrypted message to your friend. Remember to include
all relevant persons and components into the drawing.
• Phase 2: Visiting a site with HTTPS. Imagine you are
visiting a website with the HTTPS prefix (e.g. your
favorite online shop). Please make a drawing of what
makes such a site different to a site with the HTTP prefix.
• Phase 3: Online Banking. Imagine you log into your
online banking. Usually, those sites are encrypted and
you see a green lock next to the URL in your browser.
Can you please make a drawing of what happens when
you log into your bank account. Focus on what happens
between you and your bank’s website.
2) Attacker Models:
• Why is cryptography used on the Internet?
• What information does cryptography protect?
• Who is the attacker that encryption protects you against?
[Images of NSA, person in the same WiFi, Teenage
hacker in the basement, Google, Apple, Facebook]
• Please take your drawings (from before). Can you maybe
mark where an attacker could eavesdrop?
D. Post-hoc Validity Study Protocol
General:
• In your daily life, which security practices do you apply
to stay secure online?
• Do you sometimes pay attention to the green lock icon
in the browser?
• Have you ever thought about what the green lock next to
the URL means?
• What are your security expectations when you visit a site
with HTTPS and you see the green lock next to the URL
in your browser?
1) Mental Models: In the following, I’m going to ask you
to explain your perceptions and ideas about how encryption
security on the Internet works. [...]
• Phase 1*: Visiting a site with HTTPS.
• Phase 2*: Online banking.
• Phase 3*: encryption in theory.
2) Attacker Models: [...]
E. Final Set of Codes for General Questions/ Attacker Models
A. tools C. expectations on HTTPS E. administration responsibility G. info to protect
A.1 browser C.1 e2e encryption E.1 academic G.1 data: sensitive/personal/purchase
A.2 app C.2 server authentication E.2 service/industry IT G.2 data: protocol specific
A.3 service: mail/PGP C.3 safe data storage at provider E.3 service/industry other G.3 data: governmental/business
A.4 service: sensitive calls C.4 information hiding/targeted advertisements F. crypto motivation G.4 data: in transfer
A.5 privacy enhancing technologies C.5 security: general F.1 authenticity communication partner G.5 data: local
A.6 encryption: local C.6 protection: data manipulation F.2 integrity G.6 data: remote
A.7 encryption: remote C.7 protection: phishing F.3 protection: privacy/anonymity G.7 data: general
A.8 negative: mobile apps have no encryption C.8 protection: virus F.4 protection: third party G.8 data: no protection
A.9 lack of knowledge C.9 protection: eavesdropper F.5 protection: malware G.9 metadata: no protection
A.10 off topic C.10 mistrust: no eavesdropping protection F.6 protection: eavesdropper G.10 lack of knowledge
B. education content C.11 mistrust: meta data leakage F.7 protection: sensitive data G.11 off topic
B.1 work experience C.12 mistrust: general F.8 protection: general H. successful attacker
B.2 lecture/academic C.13 lack of knowledge F.9 mistrust H.1 state/police/secret service
B.3 aspect: encryption applied D. definition crypto F.10 no comment H.2 hacker
B.4 aspect: cryptography theoretical D.1 data obfuscation H.3 big player
B.5 self education: books/videos/internet D.2 data modification H.4 insider
B.6 self education: programming D.3 data tunnel H.5 provider
B.7 non technical D.4 en-/decryption keys H.6 attacker omnipresent
B.8 no education D.5 symbolic explanation H.7 no attacker
B.9 cannot remember D.6 mathematical concept
D.7 protection from eavesdroppers
D.8 lack of knowledge
F. Final Set of Codes for Mental Models
A. communication path F. visualization of encrypted message K. perceived security benefit of HTTPS P. connection between 1 and 2?
A.1 direct path F.1 not part of the model K.1 underestimated P.1 yes
A.2 additional nodes as system components F.2 scrambled text/numbers K.2 overestimated P.2 no
A.3 additional nodes as relays F.3 color K.3 realistic assesment P.3 unclear
A.4 model too sparse F.4 physical object (envelope, treasure chest) K.4 model too sparse Q. certificates are introduced in 2
B. cryptographic concepts F.5 scribbled line K.5 no control Q.1 yes
B.1 end-to-end F.6 encoded text/digits L. communication partner leaks data Q.2 implicitely (reference to 2nd drawing)
B.2 symmetric encryption F.7 lock L.1 no data leakage Q.3 no
B.3 assymetric encryption F.8 different language L.2 leaks credit card data Q.4 ”stronger” certificates
B.4 ephemeral keys F.9 chopped text L.3 undefined data leakage Q.5 yes, but they are misinterpreted
B.5 transport encryption G. provider role L.4 general distrust R. encryption point in 2
B.6 blackbox G.1 not part of the model L.5 model too sparse R.1 directly (local machine)
B.7 obfuscation or steganography G.2 keyserver M. third parties R.2 crypto proxy
B.8 authentication G.3 remote encryption component M.1 centralized encryption service/proxy R.3 after remote validation at remote service
B.9 model too sparse G.4 local encryption component M.2 PKI/CA R.4 undefined
C. definiton quality G.5 message release point M.3 (ad) tracker R.5 model too sparse
C.1 accurate model G.6 in-software encryption M.4 credit card provider/bank T. More technical buzzwords
C.2 model too sparse G.7 omnipotent observer M.5 metadata leakage T.1 yes
C.3 passphrase exchange H. confusion of concepts M.6 insiders T.2 no
C.4 authentication H.1 encryption equals authentication M.7 successful intruders T.3 conceptual representation
C.5 message is recognizable H.2 encryption is a distinct service M.8 unsuccesful intruders U. Distraction from knowledge gaps
D. key generation and exchange H.3 encryption is well-defined M.9 authentication proxy U.1 yes
D.1 model too sparse H.4 model too sparse M.10 model too sparse U.2 no
D.2 Web of Trust I. model refinement (1-2) N. HTTPS specific components U.3 knowledge gaps are explicitely admitted
D.3 PSK keyserver I.1 increased level of detail N.1 certificates V. Representation
D.4 PSK in-person key exchange I.2 decreased level of detail N.2 keys V.1 protocol-based
D.5 shared knowledge I.3 constant level of detail N.3 codebook (PKI) V.2 conceptual
D.6 PSK Undefined J. security indicators N.4 not part of the model V.3 both
E. example scenario J.1 https N.5 model too sparse V.4 model too sparse
E.1 abstract J.2 lock icon O. model refinement (2-3) W. Awareness of metadata
E.2 arbitrary messaging app J.3 check mark O.1 increased level of detail W.1 yes
E.3 WhatsApp J.4 insecurity indicator O.2 decreased level of detail W.2 no
E.4 Signal J.5 not part of the model O.3 constant level of detail
E.5 PGP/GPG
E.6 not part of the model
